INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The University of Massachusetts Labor Relations and Research Center (Center), founded in 1964, as an integrated program of graduate education, research, and direct service to workers and the labor movement. A primary concern addressed by the Labor Center's research and educational missions is the decline of collective bargaining and the rise of inequality that has accompanied the rapid growth of precarious forms of nonstandard and contingent employment. To this end, the Center initiated a Future of Work Project in 2004 to provide labor and government policy-makers with fact-driven research that examines the growth of the low-wage, contingent labor force as well as the economic and technological forces that are driving this development.
The Labor Center, along with labor centers at other University of Massachusetts campuses, has funded research and published a series of books and reports on the future of work. 1 The Center also sponsored numerous conferences attended by hundreds of labor advocates and government officials where these issues were discussed and debated. The The authors of this brief have co-wrote a report published by the Future of Work Project, as well as other legal and sociological research cited herein, addressing the role of the temporary staffing industry. They have also both taught courses on the legal and sociological issues posed by the use of temporary staffing arrangements and have consulted extensively with worker centers and other organizations involved in defending the workplace rights of the temporary staffing industry workforce.
corporate business data to facilitate their responses the shifting terrain in which labor union organizing and collective bargaining are taking place.
INTRODUCTION
Non-standard employment is compromising the ability of American workers to exercise their right to self-organization and collective bargaining. In response to the Board's request, this amicus brief provides an up-to-date assessment of the temporary staffing industry as it relates to the ability of temporary staffing workers to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed to them by federal labor law. It is widely recognized that the ubiquitous presence of millions of temporary staffing industry workers in all sectors of the U.S. labor market has given rise to a second-tier workforce, with lower wages and fewer benefits than the standard employees performing exactly the same work in the same commercial enterprise. The Board's current joint-employer test, as applied in this case, is a barrier to temporary staffing workers exercising their right to self-organization and collective bargaining. Without the ability to bargain with both the user and supplier firms that employ them, temporary workers will find it virtually impossible to alter their second-class terms and conditions of employment at the bargaining table.
ARGUMENT
The assessment of the temporary staffing industry presented herein is provided to support the Petitioner, Teamsters Local 350 and to urge that the Board find that BrownFerris Industries (hereinafter BFI or user employer) is a joint employer of the temporary staffing workforce it has retained to carry out the core recycling operations at its Republic Services facility. This conclusion is warranted because the unit employees' terms and conditions of employment are co-determined and shared by BFI and LBS pursuant to the BFI/LBS Staffing Agreement, the socio-economic structure of the work arrangement, and the intertwined role of the BFI and LBS supervisory personnel.
In this context, the Board's application of its joint-employer doctrine should be informed by and tailored to the current economic realities and labor market role of the temporary staffing industry. To this end, the Board should revive the traditional standard for determining joint-employer eschewed in Bush-era Board rulings and reject the jointemployer test as it was applied in TLI, Inc., 271 NLRB 798 (1984 ), enfd. 772 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1985 , and Laerco Transportation, 269 NLRB 324 (1984) , as both of these rulings fail to give adequate consideration to the unique economic realities of labor-only contracting.
Applying the TLI/Laerco interpretation of the joint-employer doctrine in this case, or in any case involving the temporary staffing industry, is at odds with principles set forth in Boire v. Greyhound, 376 U.S. 473 (1964) and NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3 rd Cir. 1982) . Continuing to apply the crabbed approach to jointemployer status in TLI and Laerco will have the practical effect of depriving the burgeoning temporary staffing workforce of the ability to exercise their right to engage in collective bargaining with both employers who jointly control and share the terms and conditions of their employment.
I. THE TEMPORARY STAFFING INDUSTRY'S LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING MODEL HAS CREATED A PRECARIOUS AND HIGHLY VULNERABLE SECOND-CLASS WORKFORCE
Employment through the temporary staffing industry is, by definition, precarious.
There are no explicit or implicit promises of ongoing employment in temporary staffing arrangements and, most often, the benefits and expectations attendant to long-term standard employment relationships are non-existent. 397, 402-3, 410-11 (2012) . Temp agency workers are not "employed" until they begin work at the client firm's premises, and are only paid for time clocked in while there. Agreements given to temp workers to sign by "day labor" agencies state that they are "pre-terminated," i.e., deemed to have quit when they leave their assignment at the client' firm's premises each day. Moreover, when it does, the presence of temp agency supervisory personnel does not fundamentally alter the economic realities of temping arrangements, in which the user and supplier firms codetermine and share the terms and conditions employment.
The high-volume, concentrated deployment of temps that is evidenced in this case requires temporary staffing firms to be involved with and routinely factored into their user client's management planning and deeply integrated into the day-to-day performance of the essential functions of the client's business product or service. 63 Indeed, 240 LBS temps are assigned to the BFI recycling facility for an indefinite term as the sole workforce staffing BFI's seven recycling assembly lines. Regional Director's Decision and Direction of an Election, 4 (Aug. 16, 2013) . But, contrary to the Regional Director's conclusion, this type of structural integration, as evidenced in the record, establishes that BFI and LBS share and codetermine the terms and conditions of the temporary worker unit in this case.
B. The BFI/LBS Temporary Labor Services Agreement As Written and Implemented Establishes Co-Determined and Shared Terms and Conditions of Employment
The Regional Director's conclusion that BFI is not a joint-employer should be reversed as it accords far too little factual weight and legal import to the LBS/BFI Temporary Labor Services Agreement. Jt. Ex. 1. In the seminal joint-employment case, Greyhound Corp. and Floors, Inc., following the Court's directive in Boire v. Greyhound, 376 U.S. at 481, (i.e., to examine whether the putative joint-employer exercised "sufficient control over the work of the employees"), the Board focused on whether the service agreements entered into by Greyhound and its subcontractor, Floors, exhibited the requisite level of control to establish joint-employer status for Greyhound, the user firm.
153 NLRB at 1492. The Regional Director's ruling in this case did not follow the test in Greyhound Corp. Instead, the decision treated the BFI/LBS Staffing Agreement superficially and ignored material provisions in it that allocate to BFI the highest and most determinative levels of control over the terms and conditions of employment.
Of particular importance to the unit determination of BFI/LBS temp workers (and any unit determination involving temporary staffing agencies), is the emphasis the Board has placed on the express terms in staffing agreements that provide for the "services to be actual means and methods utilized by its subcontractor to affect substantially the actual work processes of these employees." Greyhound Corp., 153 NLRB at 1492; see Sun-Maid Growers and IBEW Local 100, 239 NLRB 346, 348 (1978) . (finding joint employment when employees' duties integral to user's production process and agreement did not vest in supplier independent control of employees that is inconsistent with user exercising substantial control over manner and means by which joint employees performed services).
The Regional Director's decision either ignores or gives short shrift this and to other terms enumerated in the BFI/LBS agreement that cede critical indicia of control over the temporary workforce's terms and conditions of employment to BFI supervisors and management. These include: BFI setting a ceiling for the temp workers wage rates, Jt. Ex. 1, par. 3; BFI's responsibility for skills training and/or safety training of employees when the "position requires [. . . ] knowledge or ability that is particular to Client's operation," Jt. Jt.
Ex. 1, par. 4 & 5; Client's right to set "standard selection procedures and tests" used to hire temps, Jt. Ex. 1, par 4; Client's "right to reject or discontinue use of "any temporary employees "for any or no reason" including to reject workers previously directly employed by BFI or those not "free from the effects of drugs or alcohol"; Jt. Ex. 1., par. 4 & 7. 65 Given the structure of temporary staffing agreements and the manner in which they are implemented, the Regional Director's refrain -that supervision was performed "solely"
by the staffing agency, LBS -lacks factual foundation. This unduly reductive approach, which drives the Regional Director's flawed reasoning, is problematic when determining joint-employment in temporary staffing scenarios as it ignores the economic realities of temporary staffing arrangements that vest the user employer with primary control of the work processes. Contrary to the legal conclusions the Regional Director draws from the record, the LBS on-site supervisory team does not perform its routine, daily duties independently (i.e. "solely"). Each and every aspect of their supervisory responsibility is carried out pursuant to the terms of the co-determined BFI/LBS Staffing Agreement and in accordance with management policies and supervisory directives provided to LBS supervisors and temps by BFI personnel assigned to manage and supervise its facility. the right to set the total hours of work and the "precise" time for employment as well as the shift schedules, and authorization of any overtime work. Id. Based on these findings, and because the contract was "cost-plus," Greyhound was found to "share with Floors in a substantial way the power to establish the wages of these employees -a power that goes to the crux of any employment relationship." Id. at 1494 (emphasis added).
Here, the record contains analogous facts indicating that BFI and LBS codetermine and share control over the hours and wages of the temporary workforce. BFI sets the shifts for the lines where the temporary workers perform their tasks, TR: 39, and schedules which days specific recycling lines are running, TR: 36. BFI even controls when the temp workers take their breaks. TR: 220-221. These facts establish that BFI management determines the hours of work, i.e, when the parties' temporary workforce is employed. In other words, BFI -through its "promulgation of work rules and conditions of employment, work assignments, and issuance of operating instructions" -exercises control over terms There is nothing in the statutory text of the NLRA that prevents the Board from adopting a more robust set of factors to determine joint-employer status in a manner that keeps "pace with changing patterns of industrial life." See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.
Indeed, the relevant statutory text gives the Board the ability to vary the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes to include "the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or other unit. 29 U.S.C. §159(b) (emphasis added). As such, both the user and supplier employers are properly assigned to bargain jointly with a unit including temp workers.
Similarly, the Act's definition of supervisor and employer grants the Board wide latitude in determining whether a user employer is engaged in supervising the temporary workforce to a significant extent, i.e., sufficient to establish the necessary indicia of control consequences for failure to do so). In this regard, there is no reason why factors used to determine supervisory control of a temporary workforce should be as narrowly construed as they are in Laerco and TSI, which caused the Regional Director to ignore facts showing that BFI supervisors consistently used their "authority," derived from the Staffing Agreement, when exercising "independent judgment" to either "responsibly direct" the LBS temporary workforce or to "effectively [. . . ] recommend" a bevy of directives to the LBS temporary workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Nothing in the Act's definition of supervisor or employer, permits the Board to ignore these significant indicia of supervision solely because the directives were issued by top-level BFI supervisors to low-level LBS supervisors, rather than to the temporary employees directly.
The joint-employer test applied in this case also undermines federal labor policy as it obstructs the efficacy of collective bargaining and, thereby, increases the potential for strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest in workplaces where temporary staffing arrangements are used. See 29 U.S.C. §151 (Findings). A host of mandatory subject of bargaining that LBS unit employees might choose to bring to the bargaining table cannot 70 The Act defines supervisor to mean "any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." meaningfully be addressed without involving BFI, the user employer in the bargaining process. Consider just some of the mandatory bargainable subjects: speed of the recycling lines; the hours of work; break scheduling; wage increases to create parity with standard BFI employees performing the same work as temps; adjustment or changes to safety rules promulgated by BFI that are implemented pursuant to the Staffing Agreement, or; a change in the six-month limit on the unit members' employment at BFI facilities. Each of these mandatory subjects of bargaining are either in the sole control of BFI or under the control over terms and conditions of employment codetermined or shared by BFI and LBS. It takes little imagination to foresee the potential for industrial strife when user employers, like BFI, who codetermine the terms and conditions of the temporary workers at their facilities, are legally excluded from bargaining relationships established by the Board.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Board should find that BFI is a joint-employer of the temporary workforce at its facility and to order BFI to join LBS in the process of collective bargaining should the unit workers vote to join Teamsters Local 350. 
